Creating uniform security across the police force

By Holly Sacks, Senior VP, Marketing and Corporate Strategy, HID Global

Identity and access management (IAM) continues to a huge challenge for police forces throughout the country. Enabling employees to quickly and securely access data and facilities has always been a high priority. The growing number of data sources now available to police is making it more critical than ever that the right people have access to the information they need, and that this data can be assessed and monitored in a secure way.

However, a legacy of disparate IT systems with little ability to work together means that this is no small undertaking. Police forces in different regions currently have different levels of access to different systems, each of which has its own IT platform and its own access control platform. The National Policing Improvement Agency (NPIA) has launched a review of IAM processes within the police force that is designed to bring these systems together in the best way possible. As a core part of the review, the NPIA is aiming to provide every police officer in the UK with a multi-application smart card that can combine logical and physical security.

The project focuses on authenticating the identity of officers and civilian staff who access police systems via a single user identity that can work across all police systems. With police increasingly accessing confidential data via mobile devices, in-car units and station-based PCs, the ability to safely access systems from any location will also cut costs incurred through travel while boosting the time available for frontline policing.

A nationally aligned smart card system would also reduce the IT and administrative costs associated with resetting forgotten usernames and passwords, and it would conserve man hours spent on these tasks. The police face constant demands to be a more visible presence on our streets and the ability to access IT systems with a single smart card minimises downtime spent on administrative tasks, and freeing up bobbies to get on the beat.

Another interesting potential application for smart card technology is in securely checking out firearms from a police station. Every time a police officer takes a weapon out of the police station, he or she has to show a warrant card to the person in charge of the armoury; that person will inspect the warrant card and sign a piece of paper; the paper is countersigned by the officer in charge; and only then does the requesting officer take receipt of the weapon. When the weapon is returned, the process is repeated. This kind of convoluted process is a prime example of one that could be handled electronically with a combination of radio frequency identification (RFID) tags on the firearms themselves, a contactless smart card for the officer and a contactless card smart reader at the checkout point.

As police forces across the country look to combine their logical (IT) security and physical access control into one multi-purpose system, there are several options open to them. The most basic form of secure access control is the magnetic stripe – or ‘mag-stripe’ – card, where magnetic data is stored on the back of the card. While mag-stripe cards are inexpensive to produce, they can be more costly in terms of maintenance. Magnetic stripe cards come in contact with the reader when inserted, and any debris that collects on the card inevitably ends up inside the reader and on its contact pins. They are also susceptible to magnetic interference and wear and tear: constant swiping through the card reader causes the stripe to deteriorate and eventually fail. This type of card is also extremely restricted in terms of its data storage capacity compared to that of smart cards, some of which now have up to 164K of memory.

But perhaps their biggest disadvantage is that they are very easy to clone. You can even buy a mag-stripe reader from a high-street store that will let you take data off one of these cards and use it to create an unlimited number of clones. This is clearly an unacceptable risk for the police force where officers have access to the personal details of criminals like terrorists and paedophiles. The consequences of this information being released into the public domain by someone with unauthorised access are easy to imagine.

A far more secure and flexible option is the new generation of contactless smart cards that use encryption and the internal computing power of a smart chip, reducing the risk of data being compromised or cards being duplicated. Contactless cards can offer three levels of security: single, dual or three-factor authentication. With single-factor authentication, using the card on its own will grant access to a system or open a door. Dual-factor authentication adds an extra level of security in the form of a PIN code. Three-factor authentication goes a step further, using a PIN code and an extra security measure such as a biometric scan. Contactless smart cards are traditionally used for physical access control and are now being adopted for logical access control as well.

The other advantage of contactless smart cards is the possibility for adding other applications such as contactless payments for the staff canteen, time and attendance records and authorised equipment check out.

As with all areas of the civil service, the cost of implementing and deploying a new, nationwide IAM system is a key consideration. However, the need to identify, authorise and authenticate users is a critical one. It’s clear that government and police see this drive as one that is definitely worthy of investment.

Portable and secure, contactless smart cards are fast becoming a valuable tool for safeguarding physical security and guaranteeing the privacy of sensitive electronic information across many sectors. When weighing up the costs of smart card technology against the benefits, it’s obvious that they can offer considerable value to the UK police force, saving time and money, protecting officers and civilian staff and safeguarding the public’s data.

HID Global is exhibiting at Infosecurity Europe 2010, the No. 1 industry event in Europe held on 27th – 29th April in its new venue Earl’s Court, London. The event provides an unrivalled free education programme, exhibitors showcasing new and emerging technologies and offering practical and professional expertise. For further information please visit www.infosec.co.uk

HID Global is the trusted source for secure identity solutions for millions of customers around the world. Recognised for robust quality, innovative designs and industry leadership, HID Global is the supplier of choice for OEMs, system integrators, and application developers serving a variety of markets, including physical and logical access control, card personalization, eGovernment, cashless payment and industry and logistics.

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UK and US Outline Strategy for Counter-IED Military Operations

Taliban use “IEDs to try to undermine international willingness to stay the distance.”

Prime Minister Gordon Brown announced this month that the UK government would be investing an extra £150 million (€167.61 million, $240.17 million) in countering the improvised explosive device (IED) threat to military operations in Afghanistan. This will include an additional £10 million being put towards buying 400 hand-held mine detectors on top of the £12 million allocated earlier this year for new explosive disposal robots. There are now 30 of these in operation in Afghanistan.

Brown also outlined a package of longer-term investment in counter-IED capability, which will include setting up a new base in the UK for training and military operations intelligence in this area.

The prime minister added that he had agreed with President Karzai that Afghanistan would help troops on military operations to detect and dismantle IEDs.

This will include Afghan Armed Forces being trained to detect and disable IEDs, more local police on the ground and better intelligence from local people about the source of IED attacks.

Afghans will be encouraged not to harbor those planning explosive attacks on British soldiers, President Karzai assured the British prime minister.

Afghanistan's biggest problem, and that of the West doing something there, is President Karzai. This corrupt warlord, who the allies think can be manipulated to their ends, is what keeps and causes the people to support the Taliban, as is the case in many areas. President Karzai and his ilk, in fact, are the greatest obstacle to peace in Afghanistan.

Military Operations To Take Offensive

IEDs remain a huge threat to military operations as well as the lives of troops in Afghanistan. Explosives were responsible for the deaths of 124 of the 239 UK personnel killed in the conflict since it began in October 2001. Most of these were IEDs.

Senior figures from the British military, coalition countries and the UK's Ministry of Defence scientists and engineers met in July this year for a conference to discuss strategy and tactics in countering the IED threat during military operations.

"There has been an operational switch by the Taliban who are using IEDs to try to undermine international willingness to stay the distance to achieve our long-term objectives," noted vice-chief of the British defence staff General Sir Nicholas Houghton, at the briefing in July.

Military strategists said the tactic was to adopt an offensive stance in dealing with these threats. This means attacking the networks that produce and plant IEDs as well as developing protection against them.

Linking technology, training, tactics and procedures and intelligence will be key to undertaking military operations to unearth those who finance, create and conceal the bombs.

Furthermore, armed forces will analyse data gathered from recovered IED material and information from captured insurgents.

This, combined with surveillance records, will be used to build up an understanding of the process behind IEDs. It was agreed that the strategy for military operations must also be coordinated and integrated between coalition countries, whose communications networks must be able to talk to each other.

JIEDDO Specialist Teams

More recently, the US Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization (JIEDDO) has provided battalion-level units deployed in Afghanistan with specialised counter-IED teams through its Tidal Sun pilot training initiative.

This involves training select groups of war fighters in IED forensics and technical intelligence, with the initial phase of the pilot involving 40 soldiers and Marines grouped in two teams of five or six specialists.

"Our goal is to create teams of counter-IED experts, where the IED is their dedicated focus and not a peripheral task. They won't be pulling gate guard duty on the side," said Marine Corps Colonel CJ Mahoney, JIEDDO Joint Center of Excellence chief of staff.

The pilot has involved experts from the UK Canada and Australia as well as explosive investigation experts from the US Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the Central Intelligence Agency and the National Ground Intelligence Center.

"What is unique about Tidal Sun is that it's a deliberate operation to bring together what we think are key analytical capabilities," added Command Sergeant Major Todd Burnett, JIEDDO's senior enlisted advisor.

"These teams will be able to pick up the pieces, find traces of explosive elements, find fingerprints and put their findings in a detailed analytical document," he continued.

They will examine "explosive signatures,” chemical traces and blast patterns to develop and overview of how an IED attack has unfolded. This information will then be analysed by the team and passed on to the relevant agencies for external study ahead of future military operations.

"We need to exploit all the information we can from an IED attack. Tidal Sun and the counter-IED teams enable us do that in a very robust, coherent and comprehensive way," Burnett concluded.

Without wishing to sound defeatist, the fact is that Afghanistan cannot be held and turned around into a western-style democracy. The forces of the British East India Company and later the British Army, the the Russians, have lost there.

Afghanistan is not Europe nor the USA nor even the Russia (or the former USSR). It is a tribal country where local warlords and others of that kind hold sway and democracy, the way it is being understood by the West will not work there.

The village councils are a sort and form of democracy but entirely different to the model that we are trying to impose on Afghanistan and because we are trying to impose something it is not going to work and our warriors are being killed.

A entirely different approach is required if we want to “pacify” Afghanistan.

© 2010

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Borderpol Calls For Intelligence Led Airline & Border Security

As governments worldwide scramble to respond to the so-called 'underpants bomber', Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, who boarded airplanes freely from Lagos to Amsterdam to Detroit, BORDERPOL calls for the formation of international border organization to provide an international solution to an international problem.

So far, we have heard little from the US and UK beyond speeding up the use of body scanners at airports and prescribing who should be scanned. But are scanners the answer?

A basic fact is that that there were grounds for preventing Abdulmutallab from getting on to an aircraft in the first place, as he was by then on at least two watch lists; one in the US and one in Nigeria and probably in the UK as well. He had also had a visa request to visit the UK in May 2009 rejected by the UK Border Agency and, by the time he reached Amsterdam, he was flagged in the U.S. consular database as being presumptively ineligible for a visa due to having been nominated to the terrorist watch list.

So how did this happen?

It happened in part because, believe it or not, over eight years after 9/11 we have not even begun discussions on an internationally shared watch list which could be available to embassy staff, immigration officials, border police and airport security staff involved in implementing travel, aviation and border security. Nor do we have a well established standard for deciding the level of risk that is appropriate to accept for air travelers.

Stove-piping of information remains endemic among agencies, but it is far worse between countries and is, without doubt the weakest link in international cross border security.

Sometimes information sharing is a problem with legacy information systems, sometimes due to concerns about privacy and data protection. More often than not, however, the real problem is a lack of willingness on the part of politicians and government officials to find solutions to implement it.

BORDERPOL's view is, collectively, border and transportation officials, in cooperation with intelligence and law enforcement authorities, can do a far better job of prevention than we have done so far.

BORDERPOL continues to advocate the establishment of an international global extranet designed for sharing information on suspect individuals among border agencies of allied countries involved in border security.

Held by BORDERPOL as a trusted third party; basic information on suspect individuals such as name, date and place of birth, the reason they are on the list (e.g. visa rejection, Home Office, UK), photo and source, would be available to officers of those countries that have signed up to the scheme. The system would allow them to flag up suspect individuals either for further questioning or action, such as in this case, visa rejection or withdrawal.

It is true that the integration of intelligence was faulty in this case. But there were potential opportunities for border and transportation officials to use their discretion to prevent travel or at a minimum to undertake additional screening that might have resulted in detection of the explosives.

It is here that body scanners can play an important role in security, especially against unknown clandestine terrorists like Richard Reid, the shoe-bomber who was not on anyone's radar screen.

But the technology remains imperfect. The millimetre wave and back-scatter body scanners that have until now been advocated as best practice may not have identified the explosives carried by the 'underpants bomber.' Certainly scanners of this type would not have picked up explosives carried internally, the method used by Al Qaeda suicide bomber Abdullah Hassan Tali al-Asiri back in August 2009 in an attempt to blow up Prince Nayef of Saudi Arabia.

The through-body X-ray scanner, now in the news, will indeed pick up anything carried internally or externally. They are already in operation in some airports worldwide, targeting drug traffickers. But some may deem this method practical primarily for use on targeted individuals identified by other methods. Better technologies for explosives detection for mass people screening are currently not ready for effective deployment.

In addition to focusing on improvements in screening technology, we should be devoting more serious attention to overcoming obstacles to making better information available to border authorities.

There was opportunity to pick up Abdulmutallab as a potential threat, initially at the U.S. Embassy by authorities there; and subsequently at airports in Lagos and Amsterdam. Travel and transportation security officials should have been able to access intelligence information and combine this with other information, such as his ticket paid by cash, no checked luggage and seat position (bombers tend to request seats in the area of the fuel tanks, vis-a-vis Richard Reid the shoe bomber), to call for additional screening, if not no-fly status.

While this incident clearly calls for better integration of intelligence at the outset, it remains true that travel and transportation authorities must add additional layers of prevention. An integrated security system with effective information sharing, well motivated and trained staff, using good profiling and screening techniques, operating with the appropriate technology, will make a difference.

Border policing is not like other forms of policing. It requires a specialist organization like BORDERPOL that can provide the foundation for sharing information and facilitating the complex multilateral effort which will be required to dramatically increase the effectiveness of airline and cross border security with minimum intrusion to legitimate travelers.

Let's work together to incorporate the lessons we are already learning from another near miss and make the right decisions to prevent terrorist attacks in the future.

BORDERPOL

About half of UK's armored vehicles in Afghanistan considered unfit for operations

by Michael Smith (Veshengro)

About half of the armored vehicles used by the British Army in Afghanistan are unfit for operational usage according to figures published in the Daily Telegraph – surprise, NOT!

The “Snatch Land Rovers” in use in Afghanistan (and Iraq) have been proven to be useless in Northern Ireland already and still there we re sent to Afghanistan and Iraq, putting the lives and health of soldiers at risk.

The vehicles, ranging from lightly protected patrol models to more heavily protected MRAP (mine-resistant ambush protected) types, have either proven vulnerable to insurgent roadside bombs and the topography and climate of Afghanistan, or have been pulled from service due to the need for repairs and refurbishment.

Most prominent among these vehicles are the 6x6 Mastiff (a British-configured version of the U.S. Cougar MRAP) and the 4x4 Ridgback (also based on the Cougar, in the Category 1 model). These MRAPs were procured by the Ministry of Defence under UrgentOperational Requirement (UOR) contracts extended in late 2007 and 2008. The MoD has ordered somewhere in the range of 350 Mastiffs, with 271 so far having been delivered. Of these 271 units, only 134 are rated ready for operational duties by the Army. Regarding the lighter Ridgbacks, only 73 of the 118 units are considered serviceable at the present. The first Ridgbacks and Mastiff 2s (Mastiffs converted by UK-firm NP Aerospace to an advanced armored version) were deployed in Afghanistan in June 2009, begging the question as to how many units have atrophied either through climactic conditions or combat damage.

The British Ministry of Defence (MoD), for its part, argues that repairs and refurbishment are an obvious necessity for vehicles used in combat theaters as they ensure the safety of their operators. Under fire from all sides since 2006 due to the growing list of British casualties in Afghanistan which have stemmed from improper or insufficient kit, the MoD has rushed to provide improved armored vehicles (thus the Mastiff and Ridgback UOR orders) and has placed UOR orders for armored tactical support vehicles (the Coyote, Husky and Wolfhound).

The MoD has also withdrawn the highly-criticized Snatch Land Rovers from outside-of-base duties in Afghanistan, and this was about time too. The lightly-protected Snatch Land Rovers proved particularly vulnerable to insurgent IEDs (improvised explosive devices).

Public criticism focused on why vehicles originally designed and purchased for patrolling duties in Northern Ireland would be used for operations in vastly different circumstances in the Near East.

Scrambling to retain a light-patrol vehicle element for the Afghan and Iraqi theaters, the MoD pushed out an enhanced version of the original vehicle, the Snatch Vixen, in 2008. Some 150-200 Snatch Vixens were procured, though these also proved vulnerable to roadside bombs despite the additional armor and counter-IED measures installed.The MoD is now looking to place an urgent operational requirement order for 400 new Light Protected Patrol Vehicles (LPPVs) to replace the Snatch Land Rovers. Only 358 of the total 653 are in workable condition.

All told, the MoD claims to have invested GBP 1.3 billion ($2.07 billion) on armored vehicles for the British Army from 2007 through 2009.

It has to be said that the US Army Humvee (Hummer) vehicles have not done much better either as regards to IEDs, ever since they reduced the armor plating to make them lighter for air transportation to the areas of operation.

While tanks of the normal kind, so to speak, are a little too big for operations against insurgents where IEDs are a danger the vehicles that are deployed should, however, be armored in the same way as a MBT.

© 2010

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Police force computer misuse investigation "no surprise" to 3ami

Managing Director Tim Ellsmore says protective monitoring of police systems is necessary to uphold the laws of a digital network

Manchester, 7th January 2010 (Omarketing) – Reports that there have been more than 50 cases of misuse of the force's computers in the 13th largest police force in England, Wales and Northern Ireland over the last five years (http://bit.ly/8tMBsR) comes as no surprise to Tim Ellsmore, Managing Director of 3ami, a Manchester-based company that produces audit, compliance and control technology.

"With more than 239,000 police officers employed in the UK (http://bit.ly/5622Ub), as well as larger numbers of civilian staff, it's inevitable that human nature will rear its ugly head," said Ellsmore. "Our 3ami MAS software helps police management enforce the laws of their digital network and prevent this type of situation from causing embarrassment and the suspension or dismissal of otherwise good members of staff."

Ellsmore added, "I realise how hard police forces are working, and have been working, to make true data accountability a reality in the UK. I have seen their dedication in my many interactions with police forces looking to trial and purchase our Monitoring and Audit Systems (MAS). Police forces are beginning to realise the simple truth that you can't enforce the laws of a digital workplace without being able to police and protect that workplace--and that's where comprehensive computer activity monitoring and auditing comes in."

Ellsmore said the problem with those forces that do not fully monitor the activity on their computer networks is that they have no real way of knowing whether officers or civilian staff are misusing the data they have access to, forwarding that data to third parties or even using the network to conduct personal business when they should be working. There are also the issues of viruses and malware, as well as hacker attacks, attempting to subjugate data on the police computer network, for usually criminal means.

Ellsmore went on to explain that 3ami recently conducted a survey into senior police officers' concerns about data security at UK police forces. Ellsmore noted that the security required goes beyond controlling who has access to what data and at what times.

3ami's survey - conducted among senior police officers last year - found that all respondents were in favour of audit and controls on police computer resources. Ninety-six percent said they believed abuse and/or misuse of UK police systems occurred "frequently."

According to Ellsmore, the survey also found that inadequate staffing and the lack of an effective digital audit trail were the two biggest barriers to investigating police officers or staff members suspected of illegal or inappropriate computer activity. Ellsmore pointed out that both of these barriers could be mitigated--or removed altogether--with the effective use of a comprehensive computer activity monitoring and auditing package, such as 3ami.

"The Freedom of Information Act data released to the press this month suggests that more than 400 UK police officers and civilian staff have been dismissed or disciplined on the issue of computer misuse in the last five years," he said. "It's investigations like this that highlight the fact that installing effective audit and control software is now a no-brainer in financial terms, not to mention responsibility and accountability."

For more information: www.3ami.com

3ami Monitoring and Audit System (MAS) is a complete computer activity monitoring package that tracks all changes to hardware and software throughout an organisation's entire network(s) by capturing and securely storing records of all user activity - not just on the Internet but on every application, including email, word processing, spreadsheet applications, instant messaging and online. MAS monitors and audits police systems including ANPR (CLEARTONE BOF), PNC, Niche RMS, CORVUS and Quick Address (QAS). Even when other stand alone capability is already present, MAS coordinates and corroborates all systems to provide a comprehensive auditing framework.

Developed specifically for police forces, 3ami MAS makes true data accountability possible. 3ami MAS both proactively prevents inappropriate and/or illegal computer activity from occurring and reactively tells you - with certainty - not only who is responsible, but also the full breadth of such activity, when it does occur.

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Perimeter Security

Securing the physical perimeter

by Michael Smith (Veshengro)

The delay in movement will help decrease the chances of a c rime being successful, which is why perimeter security is so important.

Masking the world a safer place is not an easy task. The Axis of Evil that exists has brought home to all of the world what an unsafe and unpredictable environment we live in. The risks of such threats exist for all, be they high profile organizations, utility suppliers,, institutions, the civil service, or any large gathering of the general public.

When referring to the environment I am not talking about the natural one here. The security treats that come from the climate change and other environmental phenomena is a different story.

Crime, anti-social behavior, terrorism; these are factors which need to be taken into account in today's society when considering security requirements, be this for objects or subjects.

But they are all factors factors which can have their level of threat reduced by a common theme – the physical perimeter and its security.

Measures such as CCTV and others can be but viewed as a deterrent. Although they may be useful in catching the act of a crime on camera they will not, in actual fact, prevent the occurrence. While CCTV pictures may lead to an arrest and conviction, if we are talking about here about a crime, they cameras will not prevent a crime or an incursion. Only good proper perimeter security can do that; or make it as hard as possible for someone to penetrate the perimeter and this is the same in real live as in cyberspace.

The physical perimeter can be a wall, a fence or just an imaginary boundary; a line in the sand, so to speak, and securing this perimeter is different for each situation. And, we are dealing here about securing the perimeter and not, as yet, about defending it.

On a fixes base, so to speak, your perimeter is the perimeter fence and/or wall followed, if the base has buildings, by the walls of buildings, and here the option of securing the perimeter are the same as everywhere, from the wire of the fence to CCTV, sensors and guards.

In the open,in the field, your perimeter that has to be secured is a fluid one, and open and field here means field, forest, etc., and especially so if and when on the move. The same, as to a fluid perimeter, is also true in today's cyber operations. Securing such a fluid perimeter is a total different kettle of fish than that of securing a fixed perimeter and the rules of engagement are mobile and fluctuate. Each and every situation and area requires a different assessment and response.

Walls, whether for countries, as in the case of the Great Wall of China, walls of cities, and all the old towns did have them, to walls such as that that such as the one that was known as the “Berlin Wall” or the wall that Israel has built against the Palestinians, are one way of securing a perimeter and dependent on the attempted breach provide quite a solid defense.

Perimeter fences, with or without guard towers, and a great example for this is here the border that was between West Germany and the German Democratic Republic, is another protection, though not as difficult to penetrate as is a solid wall. Then again, a wall with no defenders is easier to penetrate than a good fence with mine fields and defenders.

The perimeter of a building are, generally, the outer walls of said building unless there is a fence and/or wall before one gets too the building proper, as, for instance, in t he case of the MI6 HQ in London.

The weak points of a building's perimeter are, generally, its doors and windows and the locks they are secured with. Someone who does not mind making a lot of noise, for instance, will be able to overcome most doors, windows and locks.

Cameras will be a deterrent but none as good as guards, especially if the latter are armed.

Security and defense of a perimeter, as can be seen, go hand-in-hand, to some degree, for locks, for instance, and metal shutters are security while also a defense.

Perimeter security, its requirements and the possibilities available differ according to the building, property, land area and topography of the same, and the way in which the premises are to be used.

When one thinks of the term perimeter security one is immediately drawn to fencing and manned security posts; however, when defined simply as the outermost boundary to entering your premises, it casts a different light on the term.

Perimeter security can mean securing the outer boundaries of a plot of land, the main entrance/exit doors to a building, or the entrance doors to a compartment within a shared building.

Depending on the particular situation and whatever form of attack premises are likely to experience, any delay in movement will help decrease the chance of such a crime being successful, which is why perimeter security if so very important.

On the move, as mentioned previously, your perimeter is fluid and your responses to that are too; a lot more so than at any fixed location.

In field operations, in whatever terrain, when working in a team, your perimeter security are your skirmishers. When traversing the same type of area alone then the entire ballgame changes and you are your own perimeter security and you set where your perimeter is and how you are going to, if necessary, defend it.

Wild animals of all kinds, and even domesticated ones, have an invisible set of perimeters around them. There is an outer one where they will either run or let you know, in no uncertain terms more often that now, that you have gone too far and better leave.

If the inner perimeter of wild animals gets crossed then most will attack, even the likes of rats and squirrels, as anyone who has ever cornered a rat will know.

If the animal is something rather larger and more dangerous, like a hippo or a lion then the danger of serious harm arises and one better takes heed before of the warnings.

As human s we too, theoretically, have such an unseen perimeter around us and with some people this one is a wider area than with others and in military and such kind of operations it is set by different criteria as in civilian life.

Often, however, the fact that some people drop their guard, so to speak, in civilian life and that they are not as observant as they might be if alone in a forest, especially at dark, they allow attacks to happen. Some people wear an, invisible to them, sign that says “I am a victim! Attack me.”

How many of those do those of us who can spot such signs see day in day out? Many, I can tell you, and they invariably wear headphones and listen to some kind of loud music and are totally oblivious to what is going on around them, even to a car approaching from behind let alone a person intent on harming them. It is scary, I tell you.

On the move, whether in the open field or in the city, you make your own perimeter which, as said, is fluid, to some degree, and you secure it. That means, open eyes, open ears and ideally some distance from other people, in order to give yourself enough reaction time in case of need.

© 2010
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AIRPORT SECURITY A UK STRENGTH TO BUILD ON, SAYS INDUSTRY

Complex situation with body scanners only part of the solution

A|D|S, the UK's AeroSpace, Defence and Security trade organisation commented Tuesday, 01/05/2009, on recent issues around aviation security following the failed attack on an aircraft over Detroit on Christmas Day.

Ian Godden, Chairman of A|D|S, said: "The UK is a world-leader in the high-tech security field given past experience in combating terrorism plus the innovative excellence of the industry in meeting these challenges. It is a trusted supplier globally, protecting citizens around the world and with the right Government advocacy and support this expertise can be exported to also boost the UK economy. Furthermore, provided with the right levels of investment, new technology will be more effective while becoming less intrusive.

"It must be remembered that full body scanners are only part of the solution. Other solutions, such as the detection of suicide bombers from distance using technology, blast mitigation engineering and behavioural science are also important elements of airport security. Intelligence will still be crucial, as will the right systems that can be provided by industry to process the information gathered quickly and accurately.

"We also fully recognise that privacy issues must be addressed and it is right that new security solutions that protect peoples' lives should be developed with these in mind."

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