by Michael Smith
What Russia is doing with regards to the issue over the gas transiting via the Ukraine is too let Western Europe and the West as a whole know that unless we in the West play ball they way Russia wants as regards the former Soviet Republics and such like issues then they may turn off the gas.
This is the second time that this has happened with regards to Russian gas on its way to Western Europe via the gas pipeline that goes through the now independent former Soviet Republic of Ukraine.
I do sincerely doubt, however, that it would be any different would the gas be going a different route, direct to the West through, say, Poland or the still Moscow line following Belarus.
This issue over the gas for heating and industry coming from Russia shows that we are all, all our countries, people and infrastructure, in problems as we can be held to ransom that easily.
Holding the West to ransom over the issue of the gas is exactly what Russia is doing and this will not be the last time that that is going to happen, of that we can be sure.
This is no way to run a railroad and certainly no way to run a country. We must have self-sufficiency, as far as possible at least, in matters of energy, whether this be gas, oil or what-have-you. We cannot be allowed to be held to ransom by then like of the oligarchs and the FSB of Russia nor by others.
The Ukraine, in my opinion, also has a part in this ransom business, though on a different level.
While Russia appears to be using the gas as a lever so that Europe and the West reconsider their ideas of letting the Ukraine into NATO and the EU, the Ukraine is playing the game the other ways around basically saying “you can get your gas if you make us member of NATO and the EU”. This is, at least, how I read both sides and, as far as we all should be concerned we should tell the Ukraine to go to h**l if that is their attitude and at that same time, unfortunately as it may be, give in to the more-or-less unspoken request by the Russian Federation and General Putin to not let the Ukraine join any of those western clubs.
I have to say as well, and I wonder how many other people may just wonder the same, why we, in fact, are even thinking of incorporating the likes of the Ukraine into NATO and eventually also the EU.
The orange revolution, as it is often called, certainly was not democracy the way we see it here, and the leadership of the Ukraine is not as benign as they are made out. However, as in the case of the likes of Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan, both regimes with difficult human rights records and such, the USA and other NATO allies call them their friends because it is possible to have bases in their countries that are very close to Iran. Oil is a catalyst here, yet again. Black gold. But I digressed.
The West, those that do not have any of that kind of Black Gold, or gas, will nevertheless have to find a way to become independent from the oil fields of the Iran and other such countries in the same way as they have to become independent from the gas fields of Russia and other such locations.
There are ways and means of doing that and there are countries that can show the way in this as well., However, oil (and gas0 still are king when it comes to heating and cooking in the western world and especially the use of the motorcar is a contributing factor.
As it, however, shows again and again, countries that depend on such raw materials from abroad can be held to ransom at the whim of a leader of a country or by other means. Russia is not the only country that has or can have the West of a barrel like this.
Therefore, in order to protect our nations' infrastructure we must look for way of becoming, if not entirely than largely, independent from such sources and imports.
Can Russia be trusted?
The answer is a no and a yes and it depends on the angle from which one views it. Russia, and that is the problem, trusts no one and never ever will. Long story and maybe one for a separate article, methinks.
Our infrastructure needs independence from sources such as Russian gas or oil from the Persian Gulf and such locations.
How to get that done? Let's get our thinking caps on.
© M Smith (Veshengro), January 2009
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Minister Misplaces Security Pass
by Michael Smith
Is this just total incompetence, stupidity or both?
Work and Pensions Secretary James Purnell, who last year had to apologize after leaving confidential ministerial correspondence on a train, which an honest traveler returned. He now has another honest passer-by to thank with regards to yet another security lapse, so to speak.
This time the minister has managed to lose his wallet, containing a Parliamentary security pass, on a busy central London street.
The wallet, which, according to the Sunday Mirror, also contained bank cards and cash and was dropped as the MP got out of a taxi, was handed in to police by a member of the public who found it on Soho's Dean Street.
Mr Purnell's spokesman said: "James dropped his wallet when returning from some sales shopping. He is very grateful to the member of the public who handed it in."
In the previous incident, Mr Purnell had been working on papers from his ministerial "red box" during a journey from Macclesfield to London's Euston Station on October 4, 2008 which he duly left behind when disembarking the train.
The missing papers were returned three days later after they were picked up by fellow passengers.
A spokeswoman said at the time that Mr Purnell had not broken any rules in taking his red box on a train.
Prime Minister Gordon Brown said of that episode: "He'll be as concerned as me that the rules for the future ensure that these things cannot happen."
And bingo, it has happened again.
Why on earth did was the security pass in the wallet of this incompetent minister in the first place. Ever heard of pickpockets, Mr. Purnell? Apparently not. He also does not know the first rule about security passes, military ID cards, warrant cards, and such like: they do not, repeat n-o-t into the wallet with cash and store cards, credit cards, etc.
Far too often, however, this rule is being broken, whether for reasons of total stupidity or laziness, by all those that should know better, including police and security services personnel. How many cops, here and elsewhere, have I seen who have their police ID card in the window slot in their wallets? Too many, if you ask me.
While this time – yet again – no real harm was done it could have been different.
One really must ask as to whether this is total incompetence or stupidity or, possibly, both, of this minister and, I must say, this government as a whole.
How can anyone trust them with anything. Incompetence, stupidity, and lack of sense of security and all combined have been the hallmark of this government while, at the same time, they keep talking about the need for tighter security.
Oh, yes, as a means to control the people of these islands but not as far as real security is concerned. All they are concerned about is how to create a total surveillance society and a way to monitor what each and every individual in this country, from child to pensioner, is up to, where they are and what they do.
All this is not making the country any safer in reality and does not reduce crime or the possibility of terrorist attacks. All it does is taking away liberties from law-abiding people and making them into criminals in the eyes of the law enforcers for now it seems to be “guilty until proven innocent” and “yes, you have rights unless the police say you don't”.
What we do need is real security and people who make sure that our data is secure and also other information that they are entrusted with.
© M Smith (Veshengro), January 2009
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Is this just total incompetence, stupidity or both?
Work and Pensions Secretary James Purnell, who last year had to apologize after leaving confidential ministerial correspondence on a train, which an honest traveler returned. He now has another honest passer-by to thank with regards to yet another security lapse, so to speak.
This time the minister has managed to lose his wallet, containing a Parliamentary security pass, on a busy central London street.
The wallet, which, according to the Sunday Mirror, also contained bank cards and cash and was dropped as the MP got out of a taxi, was handed in to police by a member of the public who found it on Soho's Dean Street.
Mr Purnell's spokesman said: "James dropped his wallet when returning from some sales shopping. He is very grateful to the member of the public who handed it in."
In the previous incident, Mr Purnell had been working on papers from his ministerial "red box" during a journey from Macclesfield to London's Euston Station on October 4, 2008 which he duly left behind when disembarking the train.
The missing papers were returned three days later after they were picked up by fellow passengers.
A spokeswoman said at the time that Mr Purnell had not broken any rules in taking his red box on a train.
Prime Minister Gordon Brown said of that episode: "He'll be as concerned as me that the rules for the future ensure that these things cannot happen."
And bingo, it has happened again.
Why on earth did was the security pass in the wallet of this incompetent minister in the first place. Ever heard of pickpockets, Mr. Purnell? Apparently not. He also does not know the first rule about security passes, military ID cards, warrant cards, and such like: they do not, repeat n-o-t into the wallet with cash and store cards, credit cards, etc.
Far too often, however, this rule is being broken, whether for reasons of total stupidity or laziness, by all those that should know better, including police and security services personnel. How many cops, here and elsewhere, have I seen who have their police ID card in the window slot in their wallets? Too many, if you ask me.
While this time – yet again – no real harm was done it could have been different.
One really must ask as to whether this is total incompetence or stupidity or, possibly, both, of this minister and, I must say, this government as a whole.
How can anyone trust them with anything. Incompetence, stupidity, and lack of sense of security and all combined have been the hallmark of this government while, at the same time, they keep talking about the need for tighter security.
Oh, yes, as a means to control the people of these islands but not as far as real security is concerned. All they are concerned about is how to create a total surveillance society and a way to monitor what each and every individual in this country, from child to pensioner, is up to, where they are and what they do.
All this is not making the country any safer in reality and does not reduce crime or the possibility of terrorist attacks. All it does is taking away liberties from law-abiding people and making them into criminals in the eyes of the law enforcers for now it seems to be “guilty until proven innocent” and “yes, you have rights unless the police say you don't”.
What we do need is real security and people who make sure that our data is secure and also other information that they are entrusted with.
© M Smith (Veshengro), January 2009
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Incident Command - 3rd Edition (2008)
Fire and Rescue Manual - Volume 2: Fire Service Operations
by Michael Smith
UK: Incident command systems are vital for managing risk within fire brigades. This new and updated edition of Incident Command: Fire and Rescue Manual - Volume 2: Fire Service Operations develops the subject, particularly in the area of dynamic risk assessment and command competence. This guide details the doctrine of the Fire and Rescue Service (FRS) in the context of operational incident management, leadership, and the functional command and control processes that flow from it.
This new edition of the manual also reflects the need for Fire and Rescue Services to be able to work effectively within a broader multi-agency incident management framework. Further to recent legislation this publication offers guidance in respect to the increasingly broad role of Fire and Rescue Services in incidents other than fire. This role is then considered in relation to the capacities, objectives, and constraints of other responding agencies. Essential reading for Fire Brigade Service managers and those involved in incident response across all of the emergency services.
To purchase a copy, go to www.communities.gov.uk/publications/fire/incidentcommand3rd where you can also download a free copy as a PDF document.
I have done just that and in due course, once I have been able to read through this publication a little, I shall try to bring you, the reader, a little review of it here.
(C) M Smith (Veshengro), January 2008
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by Michael Smith
UK: Incident command systems are vital for managing risk within fire brigades. This new and updated edition of Incident Command: Fire and Rescue Manual - Volume 2: Fire Service Operations develops the subject, particularly in the area of dynamic risk assessment and command competence. This guide details the doctrine of the Fire and Rescue Service (FRS) in the context of operational incident management, leadership, and the functional command and control processes that flow from it.
This new edition of the manual also reflects the need for Fire and Rescue Services to be able to work effectively within a broader multi-agency incident management framework. Further to recent legislation this publication offers guidance in respect to the increasingly broad role of Fire and Rescue Services in incidents other than fire. This role is then considered in relation to the capacities, objectives, and constraints of other responding agencies. Essential reading for Fire Brigade Service managers and those involved in incident response across all of the emergency services.
To purchase a copy, go to www.communities.gov.uk/publications/fire/incidentcommand3rd where you can also download a free copy as a PDF document.
I have done just that and in due course, once I have been able to read through this publication a little, I shall try to bring you, the reader, a little review of it here.
(C) M Smith (Veshengro), January 2008
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“What if……” a 3-day interactive radio campaign
UK: On January 12th – 14th 2009, BBC local radio stations will be running an interactive campaign designed to help families prepare for emergencies such as flood, fire, chemical leaks or pandemic flu.
The idea came from BBC audiences and is being driven by Local Radio. At the beginning of 2008 a conference was held called ‘Beyond the Floods’ where the BBC invited Emergency Responders (i.e. Blue Light services, Emergency Planners, Cabinet Office and Utilities like Water, Power, Telecoms, Met Office & Environment Agency) to discuss the lessons identified during the floods of 2007.
One of the main outcomes of that meeting was a consensus between the BBC and the Emergency Responders that the BBC needed to provide warning and informing advice before the next floods not when the water was lapping at the door.
One of the main learning points during the floods of 2007 was the huge number of people who turned to the BBC's web pages for advice – 7.9 million in 2 weeks hit the Radio Gloucestershire site.
The main day is Monday 12th January, when it is hoped to have an exclusive report for Local Radio Breakfast programmes about Cobra, the Cabinet Office briefing room, to kick off the campaign.
The schedule, which will vary from station to station both in timing and content, may also include:
- a ‘What If ‘phone in with Emergency Planners looking at flood preparations and asking the audience what they would do in certain circumstances.
- Drivetime - a quiz about driving in bad weather.
- it will be explained why messages such as 'Don’t panic' are regarded by some fire chiefs as being out of date and why they could endanger lives.
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The idea came from BBC audiences and is being driven by Local Radio. At the beginning of 2008 a conference was held called ‘Beyond the Floods’ where the BBC invited Emergency Responders (i.e. Blue Light services, Emergency Planners, Cabinet Office and Utilities like Water, Power, Telecoms, Met Office & Environment Agency) to discuss the lessons identified during the floods of 2007.
One of the main outcomes of that meeting was a consensus between the BBC and the Emergency Responders that the BBC needed to provide warning and informing advice before the next floods not when the water was lapping at the door.
One of the main learning points during the floods of 2007 was the huge number of people who turned to the BBC's web pages for advice – 7.9 million in 2 weeks hit the Radio Gloucestershire site.
The main day is Monday 12th January, when it is hoped to have an exclusive report for Local Radio Breakfast programmes about Cobra, the Cabinet Office briefing room, to kick off the campaign.
The schedule, which will vary from station to station both in timing and content, may also include:
- a ‘What If ‘phone in with Emergency Planners looking at flood preparations and asking the audience what they would do in certain circumstances.
- Drivetime - a quiz about driving in bad weather.
- it will be explained why messages such as 'Don’t panic' are regarded by some fire chiefs as being out of date and why they could endanger lives.
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Perimeter Security
In today's world our perimeter to be secured is not just the immediate physical of building walls, fences and borders.
by Michael Smith
While the Great Wall of China did something for that country by way of protection and a good perimeter fence and watchtowers may guard and protect a military or such installation, we must consider today, in the world of computers and the Internet, also and especially our virtual perimeter. This, in many case, is rather fluid.
While many companies, institutions, and others, place guards at their entrances, require passes of all kinds of levels, have fences, intruder sensors, and much more, despite the fact that they work rather on an international level, and have all manner of anti-virus protection and all manner protection against all manner of intrusions, by way of firewalls and such, few, so it would appear, have a policy in place to ensure that sensitive and mission critical data is not taken out by employees, especially temporary staff, or disgruntled staff, on removable medis such as floppy discs (yes, I am showing my age here, for I even remember when they, in fact, were floppy and rather big as well), to CDs/DVDs, USB flash memory, or even small removable USB hard drives.
We all have seen what can happen – and I am sure we all wonder where that data that was thus lost is now – when the likes of the British government offices sent data, very sensitive data, unencrypted, around the country on CDs.
Apparently, the real problem is that the two departments concerned have different encryption tools and the receiving department would not have been able to read the data had the discs been encrypted. No one thought of those implications before? Doh?!?
This is very much like NATO with all its different kinds of weapons and even communications systems all of which could really have caused a great deal of trouble had we ever had to go to war with the Warsaw Pact in those days. Unlike us they all had everything interchangeable. Proper compatibility should have been thought of one would have thought but, it does not seem to be thus. But, alas, those that sit in ivory towers.
Encryption is but one thing.
That, however, which often – more often than not – gets forgotten as far as securing data is the “physical” security of it and securing the ports – not the shipping kind though.
Who has access to the USB ports and do they need to be able to remove data by downloading it on removable media?
Organizations go to all lengths to control access to a network from the outside but often have no policy and measures in place for securing the devices. This means that basically anyone can steal sensitive data by using a USB memory stick, for instance, or an iPod.
The question is to ask who has access in an organization who could compromise data, as this could be more important than the possibility of an external breach and resultant data theft.
Too often only the “break in” from the outside into the system is being considered as far as data and security is concerned and the he possibility of data theft from within an organization by an employee is often overlooked.
Today with flash memory devices getting smaller and smaller and also being “concealed” in other objects, such as pens, and also getting more powerful with ever more data storage capacity plugging in a USB stick and copying a large amount of data only takes from some seconds to something like ten minutes and USB sticks nowadays are so common and, in fact, part of work, that the fact that someone has one or more on his or her person says and means nothing to the security guards, for instance. Hence the protection has to be at a different level.
Music players too, such as an iPod or similar, straight-forward MP3 player can often store data aside from just music files and are therefore also a way in which data can leave your institution; a way in which someone can take out data who, maybe, should not be able to.
Also, such devices, whether players or memory sticks, and such like, can be used by someone with malicious intent, whether employee or not, to inject malware into a PC or an entire network. All it needs is access to computer that is not locked down, for instance.
It would appear that many organizations do not have any systems and policy in place that control who may access and especially copy data to removable media of whatever kind.
All it takes, as we have seen more than once, is a disgruntled employee – or even an ex-employee whose password and such is still active – to ruin the reputation of an organization or to hold it to ransom.
© M Smith (Veshengro), December 2008
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by Michael Smith
While the Great Wall of China did something for that country by way of protection and a good perimeter fence and watchtowers may guard and protect a military or such installation, we must consider today, in the world of computers and the Internet, also and especially our virtual perimeter. This, in many case, is rather fluid.
While many companies, institutions, and others, place guards at their entrances, require passes of all kinds of levels, have fences, intruder sensors, and much more, despite the fact that they work rather on an international level, and have all manner of anti-virus protection and all manner protection against all manner of intrusions, by way of firewalls and such, few, so it would appear, have a policy in place to ensure that sensitive and mission critical data is not taken out by employees, especially temporary staff, or disgruntled staff, on removable medis such as floppy discs (yes, I am showing my age here, for I even remember when they, in fact, were floppy and rather big as well), to CDs/DVDs, USB flash memory, or even small removable USB hard drives.
We all have seen what can happen – and I am sure we all wonder where that data that was thus lost is now – when the likes of the British government offices sent data, very sensitive data, unencrypted, around the country on CDs.
Apparently, the real problem is that the two departments concerned have different encryption tools and the receiving department would not have been able to read the data had the discs been encrypted. No one thought of those implications before? Doh?!?
This is very much like NATO with all its different kinds of weapons and even communications systems all of which could really have caused a great deal of trouble had we ever had to go to war with the Warsaw Pact in those days. Unlike us they all had everything interchangeable. Proper compatibility should have been thought of one would have thought but, it does not seem to be thus. But, alas, those that sit in ivory towers.
Encryption is but one thing.
That, however, which often – more often than not – gets forgotten as far as securing data is the “physical” security of it and securing the ports – not the shipping kind though.
Who has access to the USB ports and do they need to be able to remove data by downloading it on removable media?
Organizations go to all lengths to control access to a network from the outside but often have no policy and measures in place for securing the devices. This means that basically anyone can steal sensitive data by using a USB memory stick, for instance, or an iPod.
The question is to ask who has access in an organization who could compromise data, as this could be more important than the possibility of an external breach and resultant data theft.
Too often only the “break in” from the outside into the system is being considered as far as data and security is concerned and the he possibility of data theft from within an organization by an employee is often overlooked.
Today with flash memory devices getting smaller and smaller and also being “concealed” in other objects, such as pens, and also getting more powerful with ever more data storage capacity plugging in a USB stick and copying a large amount of data only takes from some seconds to something like ten minutes and USB sticks nowadays are so common and, in fact, part of work, that the fact that someone has one or more on his or her person says and means nothing to the security guards, for instance. Hence the protection has to be at a different level.
Music players too, such as an iPod or similar, straight-forward MP3 player can often store data aside from just music files and are therefore also a way in which data can leave your institution; a way in which someone can take out data who, maybe, should not be able to.
Also, such devices, whether players or memory sticks, and such like, can be used by someone with malicious intent, whether employee or not, to inject malware into a PC or an entire network. All it needs is access to computer that is not locked down, for instance.
It would appear that many organizations do not have any systems and policy in place that control who may access and especially copy data to removable media of whatever kind.
All it takes, as we have seen more than once, is a disgruntled employee – or even an ex-employee whose password and such is still active – to ruin the reputation of an organization or to hold it to ransom.
© M Smith (Veshengro), December 2008
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Powers of RIPA legislation abused
Ex-Chief of MI5 'astonished'
by Michael Smith
The Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act (RIPA) was passed in 2000 to regulate the way in which public bodies such as the police and the security services carry out surveillance.
To begin with originally only a small handful of authorities were able to use RIPA but its scope has, for some reason, been expanded enormously and now there are at least 792 organisations using it, including hundreds of local councils.
This has generated dozens of complaints about anti-terrorism legislation being used to spy on, for example, a nursery suspected of selling pot plants unlawfully, a family suspected of lying about living in a school catchment area, and paperboys suspected of not having the right paperwork.
Now those campaigning against the abuse of RIPA have got a new ally in the person Lady Manningham-Buller, the former head of MI5. In a speech in the House of Lords recently, she said she was "astonished" when she found out how many organisations were getting access to RIPA powers.
Those that nowadays, more or less willy-nilly seem to be granted the right to carry our surveillance for this or that reason, should never, so it seems as far as the Security Services are and were concerned, be given those powers and rightly so.
While there may be reasons in fact for councils and others to, at times,m be granted powers under RIPA no council, per se, needs to carry our covert surveillance of dustbins for instance as to what people put into them. The same is true in respect to other uses that RIPA has been used for.
When RIPA was introduced the activities authorised by that legislation were meant be confined to the intelligence and security agencies, the police, and Customs and Excise.
The legislation was drafted at the urgent request of the intelligence and security community so that its techniques would be compatible with the Human Rights Act when it came into force in 2000.
Nowadays, however, for reasons unfathomable, every authority of whatever kind, from local councils and trading standards – and that latter one can still be understood – over the Milk Marketing Board equivalent and the one responsible for eggs and whatever else, aside from police, security services and HMRC, that is to say Customs and Excise, are given such covert surveillance powers.
Britain is the fast becoming, if it is not already, an all-pervasive surveillance society and British subjects are the most spied upon people on this planet, ahead even, so it would appear to citizens of Russian and even of Cuba.
On the principle governing the use of intrusive techniques which invade people's privacy, there must be total clarity in the law as to what is permitted and they should be used only in cases where the threat justifies them and their use is proportionate.
Presently, however, it would appear to be neither and as far as a great many people who are in the know amongst the general public are concerned this is very disconcerting and it is creating resentment amongst the people.
However, it seems that the current Labor administration in the United Kingdom could care less as to what the public thinks really. They have a majority in the House and hence do not care one iota about the people.
How can we expect to combat terrorism on our shores when we alienate the general law-abiding public who should be the eyes and ears of the authorities by using spy techniques and anti-terror legislation against them who have done nothing wrong.
The idea of the DNA and fingerprint database and the idea of monitoring all email and Internet traffic of every subject of Her Britannic Majesty is not going to bring the people onto the side of the government. Rather the opposite.
People who work in the field of security, I am sure, can see that but those that try to lord it over the people, whether central or local government do not care, it would seem. Councils up and down the country use RIPA powers against people that may or may not put the wrong stuff into their dustbins; who may put their dustbins out at the wrong day, and such like. As far as I, and Lady Manningham-Buller, see this is a total misuse of the powers of the act. Time some reigning on was done here.
© M Smith (Veshengro), December 2008
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by Michael Smith
The Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act (RIPA) was passed in 2000 to regulate the way in which public bodies such as the police and the security services carry out surveillance.
To begin with originally only a small handful of authorities were able to use RIPA but its scope has, for some reason, been expanded enormously and now there are at least 792 organisations using it, including hundreds of local councils.
This has generated dozens of complaints about anti-terrorism legislation being used to spy on, for example, a nursery suspected of selling pot plants unlawfully, a family suspected of lying about living in a school catchment area, and paperboys suspected of not having the right paperwork.
Now those campaigning against the abuse of RIPA have got a new ally in the person Lady Manningham-Buller, the former head of MI5. In a speech in the House of Lords recently, she said she was "astonished" when she found out how many organisations were getting access to RIPA powers.
Those that nowadays, more or less willy-nilly seem to be granted the right to carry our surveillance for this or that reason, should never, so it seems as far as the Security Services are and were concerned, be given those powers and rightly so.
While there may be reasons in fact for councils and others to, at times,m be granted powers under RIPA no council, per se, needs to carry our covert surveillance of dustbins for instance as to what people put into them. The same is true in respect to other uses that RIPA has been used for.
When RIPA was introduced the activities authorised by that legislation were meant be confined to the intelligence and security agencies, the police, and Customs and Excise.
The legislation was drafted at the urgent request of the intelligence and security community so that its techniques would be compatible with the Human Rights Act when it came into force in 2000.
Nowadays, however, for reasons unfathomable, every authority of whatever kind, from local councils and trading standards – and that latter one can still be understood – over the Milk Marketing Board equivalent and the one responsible for eggs and whatever else, aside from police, security services and HMRC, that is to say Customs and Excise, are given such covert surveillance powers.
Britain is the fast becoming, if it is not already, an all-pervasive surveillance society and British subjects are the most spied upon people on this planet, ahead even, so it would appear to citizens of Russian and even of Cuba.
On the principle governing the use of intrusive techniques which invade people's privacy, there must be total clarity in the law as to what is permitted and they should be used only in cases where the threat justifies them and their use is proportionate.
Presently, however, it would appear to be neither and as far as a great many people who are in the know amongst the general public are concerned this is very disconcerting and it is creating resentment amongst the people.
However, it seems that the current Labor administration in the United Kingdom could care less as to what the public thinks really. They have a majority in the House and hence do not care one iota about the people.
How can we expect to combat terrorism on our shores when we alienate the general law-abiding public who should be the eyes and ears of the authorities by using spy techniques and anti-terror legislation against them who have done nothing wrong.
The idea of the DNA and fingerprint database and the idea of monitoring all email and Internet traffic of every subject of Her Britannic Majesty is not going to bring the people onto the side of the government. Rather the opposite.
People who work in the field of security, I am sure, can see that but those that try to lord it over the people, whether central or local government do not care, it would seem. Councils up and down the country use RIPA powers against people that may or may not put the wrong stuff into their dustbins; who may put their dustbins out at the wrong day, and such like. As far as I, and Lady Manningham-Buller, see this is a total misuse of the powers of the act. Time some reigning on was done here.
© M Smith (Veshengro), December 2008
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Environmental protesters get into secure airport area
What the h*** happened to the security?
by Michael Smith
When, on Monday, December 8, 2008, environmental activists, gained access to a high security area air side on Stanstead airport in Essex one can only ask as to what the h*** has happened to the security at that airport, whether their own security teams or the police. Was everyone asleep at that time of the early morning?
If that is the security on the air side side of our airports then what is going to prevent a more or less major terrorist attack. If environmental activist – unarmed – except for bolt croppers and such like – can get air side on a more or less major airport, the second-largest airport in the UK in fact.
Not so long ago activists got onto a parked aircraft at Heathrow, Britain's largest airport, and one of the world's busiest and no one had noticed until some of them in fact unfurled a banner on the plane.
I must say that if that is our air side security at airports then all the other security measures are a waste of time and useless and will not make our airports and air travel secure.
While those measures aimed at air travelers inconvenience those traveling by air and make check ins and arrivals and longer process they will not prevent explosives, for instance, being placed on a plane. Not as long as the security on airports remains a joke as it is presently. The problem is that this joke is not funny by a long shot.
All the measures currently in place, as I have said already, do is inconvenience the airline travelers and not the terrorists for all they have to do is get air side, by cutting through a fence a la environmental activists and place a device at the belly, for instance, of a parked aircraft. And, the way security (what security?) is on that side of the airports at the present this is not, despite what we are being told, a difficult undertaking and this should make us really worried.
This is also very much the same as regards to security of the railroad rolling stock. While, for instance, as regards to the Eurostar trains, for example, airport style scanners and security checks are used and now even small penknives are illegal to be taken on that train there is very little stopping any more or less determined person getting near the parked trains and attaching a device to it or getting onto the tracks and sabotaging them.
I know that as much as with cyber security there is no 100% security possible anywhere and it cannot be unless we would surrender all our liberties and freedoms and we, as people, should take some responsibility – in fact the greatest part of it – for our own personal security and that of our families and loved ones, and, to some degree of society as a whole.
However, when we look at the ease that people can get into supposedly secure areas and get onto, as in the instance of Heathrow, a parked aircraft then we must ask what is going on.
One must then also wonder as to whether there really is the threat that we are told is there or are we just being told that so that the powers that be can make things more and more difficult for the ordinary people to go about their daily lives, such as having biometric ID cards (probably with transponders) forced upon them and the threat that any cop may demand to see ID and if no ID carried that one then might find oneself in jail.
If the security is allowed to be as lax as it appears to be then on can but come to the conclusion that in reality there is no such threat as the security services and government keep trying to tell us. If not then the lackadaisical approach taken to the air side security at British airports is criminal negligence and some heads should, nay indeed must, roll, and security must be made nigh on watertight.
As I said already, I know, and I hope that everybody else does too, that there is no such things as 100% security without living in a fortress and giving up all liberties and freedoms, and it would be then that the terrorists and enemies of freedom have succeeded and this we must not allow to happen.
If anyone is supposed to feel secure again flying – I for one would not, then again I do not like flying, period – then air side security must be enhanced and made as good as watertight. No good inconveniencing the passengers with all those checks and searches and restrictions when anyone can just saunter into any airport directly through the fence with bolt cutters and then can do, unmolested for quite some time, what they wish to do. There are many countries in the world where anyone entering such a secure are of an airport would simply be shot by snipers.
I do not think that we would, necessarily, want to have such kind of operations in the United Kingdom, but...
© M Smith (Veshengro), December 2008
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by Michael Smith
When, on Monday, December 8, 2008, environmental activists, gained access to a high security area air side on Stanstead airport in Essex one can only ask as to what the h*** has happened to the security at that airport, whether their own security teams or the police. Was everyone asleep at that time of the early morning?
If that is the security on the air side side of our airports then what is going to prevent a more or less major terrorist attack. If environmental activist – unarmed – except for bolt croppers and such like – can get air side on a more or less major airport, the second-largest airport in the UK in fact.
Not so long ago activists got onto a parked aircraft at Heathrow, Britain's largest airport, and one of the world's busiest and no one had noticed until some of them in fact unfurled a banner on the plane.
I must say that if that is our air side security at airports then all the other security measures are a waste of time and useless and will not make our airports and air travel secure.
While those measures aimed at air travelers inconvenience those traveling by air and make check ins and arrivals and longer process they will not prevent explosives, for instance, being placed on a plane. Not as long as the security on airports remains a joke as it is presently. The problem is that this joke is not funny by a long shot.
All the measures currently in place, as I have said already, do is inconvenience the airline travelers and not the terrorists for all they have to do is get air side, by cutting through a fence a la environmental activists and place a device at the belly, for instance, of a parked aircraft. And, the way security (what security?) is on that side of the airports at the present this is not, despite what we are being told, a difficult undertaking and this should make us really worried.
This is also very much the same as regards to security of the railroad rolling stock. While, for instance, as regards to the Eurostar trains, for example, airport style scanners and security checks are used and now even small penknives are illegal to be taken on that train there is very little stopping any more or less determined person getting near the parked trains and attaching a device to it or getting onto the tracks and sabotaging them.
I know that as much as with cyber security there is no 100% security possible anywhere and it cannot be unless we would surrender all our liberties and freedoms and we, as people, should take some responsibility – in fact the greatest part of it – for our own personal security and that of our families and loved ones, and, to some degree of society as a whole.
However, when we look at the ease that people can get into supposedly secure areas and get onto, as in the instance of Heathrow, a parked aircraft then we must ask what is going on.
One must then also wonder as to whether there really is the threat that we are told is there or are we just being told that so that the powers that be can make things more and more difficult for the ordinary people to go about their daily lives, such as having biometric ID cards (probably with transponders) forced upon them and the threat that any cop may demand to see ID and if no ID carried that one then might find oneself in jail.
If the security is allowed to be as lax as it appears to be then on can but come to the conclusion that in reality there is no such threat as the security services and government keep trying to tell us. If not then the lackadaisical approach taken to the air side security at British airports is criminal negligence and some heads should, nay indeed must, roll, and security must be made nigh on watertight.
As I said already, I know, and I hope that everybody else does too, that there is no such things as 100% security without living in a fortress and giving up all liberties and freedoms, and it would be then that the terrorists and enemies of freedom have succeeded and this we must not allow to happen.
If anyone is supposed to feel secure again flying – I for one would not, then again I do not like flying, period – then air side security must be enhanced and made as good as watertight. No good inconveniencing the passengers with all those checks and searches and restrictions when anyone can just saunter into any airport directly through the fence with bolt cutters and then can do, unmolested for quite some time, what they wish to do. There are many countries in the world where anyone entering such a secure are of an airport would simply be shot by snipers.
I do not think that we would, necessarily, want to have such kind of operations in the United Kingdom, but...
© M Smith (Veshengro), December 2008
<>
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